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Noms ANmD CoMMENrs
used in upholding the contracts and preventing the escape clauses
from rendering the government's promises illusory. However, it is sub-
mitted that the result reached in the Weisbrod case is sound. As in-
ferred by the court in the Sylvan Crest Sand and Gravel case, it is un-
likely that the government would induce someone to contract with
them and then reserve an option to cancel that would render their
promise illusory and defeat the contract. It would indeed be a hard-
ship for a person believing in good faith that he has a contract with
the government to expend money in making preparations to perform
and possibly pass up other opportunities to make profitable contracts,
and then find that he does not have an enforceable agreement.
To uphold the good faith of the government, it is submitted that
the present case could reasonably be construed to mean that the gov-
ernment might only exercise its right to cancel upon giving notice or
for cause. This could be done without doing violence to the contract
or the apparent intention of the parties at the time the contract was
entered into.
CoNLEY WUXEMSON
EQUAL PROTECTION-ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
In the 1953 Spring Term of the United States Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Minton read the last rites over the racial restrictive covenant.
Delivering the opinion of the court in Barrows v. Jackson,' he answered
in the negative the question: Can a racial restrictive covenant be
enforced at law by a suit for damages against a co-covenantor who
allegedly broke the covenant?2
The problem arose when the petitioners sued the respondents at
law for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant which the parties
entered into as owners of residential real estate in the same neighbor-
hood in Los Angeles, California. Briefly, the covenant provided that
each of the signers agreed that he, his heirs and assigns would never
allow any of his property to be used or occupied by non-Caucasians
other than servants of owners or tenants. This covenant was to run
with the land and was to be incorporated in all deeds, papers and
transfers of the property. Respondents allegedly conveyed to Negroes
1 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
-These covenants appear: 1) as conditions in deeds, 2) in contracts for sale
of real property, and 3) in agreements between property owners. Note, 20 Miss.
L. J. 101 (1948).
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who moved in and occupied the premises, whereupon the petitioners
sued for the breach.
The trial court sustained the respondents' demurrer, the District
Court of Appeals affirmed,3 the Supreme Court of California denied
a hearing, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted cer-
tiorari4 to consider the conflicts which had arisen in similar state court
decisions since the notable case of Shelley v. Kraemer.5
In refusing the damages sought by petitioners, the Court main-
tained that although the covenant was valid, and no constitutional
rights of the Negroes had been violated by the respondents' voluntary
adherence to its terms (which would be individual discriminatory
action only) nevertheless when, as here, the covenantee sues the cove-
nantor for a breach of his agreement and seeks to use the state ju-
diciary system to recover compensation for the breach, a judgment
for damages would be state action prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Court reasoned that if a defendant covenantor could be sued
for damages by the covenantee, then the state would be punishing
the covenantor for not discriminating. The coercion through probable
economic loss by suit in this situation would cause land owners to
refrain from breaching their covenants. Thus two courses of action
could result. One, if the vendee did not sell, it would be because of
this state coercion by probable suit, and therefore Negroes could not
buy land that white persons could buy. This is discrimination caused
solely by fear of state enforcement and not by the covenantor's free
choice.6 Two, if the vendee did sell to a Negro, he would have to
demand an increased price greatly out of proportion to the land's
value, in order to insure himself from loss by the state-enforced suit
that is sure to follow. Again the Negro would be discriminated against
because he could not purchase the land on the same basis as a white
person.7
' 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P. 2d 99 (1952).
4 345 U. S. 902 (1953).
334 U. S. 1 (1948).
To compel respondent to respond in damages would be for the state to
punish her for her failure to perform her convenant to discriminate against non-
Caucasians in the use of her property. If the state may thus punish respondent
for her failure to carry out her covenant, she is coerced to continue to use her
property in a discriminatory manner... thus it becomes not respondent's voluntary
choice that she observe her covenant or suffer damages . . ." Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U. S. 249 at 254 (1953).
7 "If a state court awards damages for breach of a restrictive covenant, a
prospective seller of restrictive land will either refuse to sell to non-Causians or
else will require non-Causians to pay a higher price to meet the damages which
the seller may incur. Solely because of their race, non-Caucasians will be unable
to purchase, own and enjoy property on the same terms as Caucasians. Denial of
the right by state actions deprives such non-Causians undentifiable of equal pro-
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The Court's basis for this theory is Shelley v. Kraemer. Repeated
reference is made to that case by Mr. Justice Minton. His major
premise and arguments are taken directly from Shelley v. Kraemer and
extended to the facts in Barrows v. Jackson. In order to understand
fully the following discussions of the Supreme Court and the various
state courts, certain points of Shelley v. Kraemer should be empha-
sized.
In Shelley v. Kraemer the Court faced the question of whether
court enforcement of these covenants by injunction was such state
action as could be deemed unconstitutional. The facts in the Shelley
case established that in February, 1911, 80 out of 39 property owners
in a St. Louis area signed an agreement mutually promising to restrict
the use and occupancy of their land for 50 years to Caucasians. In
August, 1945, pursuant to sale, Shelley, a Negro, received a warranty
deed from one Fitzgerald to the parcel of land in question.8 In Octo-
ber, 1945, Kraemer brought suit in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to
have Shelley restrained from taking possession and to divest him of
title to this land. The requested relief was denied on the ground that
the intent of the original covenantors was that the covenant was to
take effect only when and if all property owners had signed the agree-
ment. On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, the trial court was
reversed and the relief prayed for was granted. The Court sitting
en banc held that the agreement was effective and that no federal
constitutional rights of Shelley's were violated.
Chief Justice Vinson, in stating the opinion of the Court, pointed
out that in Corrigan v. Buckley9 the Supreme Court had concluded
that these covenants in and of themselves were valid. The reason was
that the Constitution prohibited state action'0 only," and the making
of this covenant was individual action. Having thus assumed that the
covenants were valid, Chief Justice Vinson then turned to the question
of whether or not they were enforceable in state courts. He pointed
out that although the action complained of was not action of a state
legislature or a city council in passing a discriminatory statute or
tection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 346 U. S. 249 at
254 (1953).
'The trial court found that the real estate agent who sold Shelley the property
in Fitzgerald's name concealed his ownership. Shelley had no knowledge of this
fact or of the restrictive covenant. This appears to be a typical trick.
'271 U. S. 323 (1926) (involving enforcement of covenents on land in the
District of Columbia).
"0 City ordinances prohibiting colored persons from occupying houses in an
area where a majority of whites lived, held unconstitutional. See Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) and Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668 (1927)
(ordinance prohibiting Negroes from establishing a home in a white neighborhood
except by a majority vote of the opposite color).8 U. S. CONST. A-mEND. XIV.
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ordinance, it nevertheless was "state action" because of the enforce-
ment by the state judicial system of a private agreement. 12 The Chief
Justice noted that private conduct is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion,13 but he distinguished this case by pointing out that these private
agreements had no teeth, that is, no power as such, unless the state
with its judicial system enforced them.' 4
To develop and define "state action," the Chief Justice quoted
from Ex Parte Commonwealth of Virginia,5 "A state acts by its legis-
lative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other
way." Following this thought he referred to the Civil Rights Case16
where the Court held that any "manisfestations of state authority"
whether they be in the shape of laws, customs or judicial or executive
proceedings, are state action and are made void by the Fourteenth
Amendment if they are inconsistent with any of the guarantees con-
tained in it.'7
Having thus established two points of his argument, that is that
the covenant was valid and that "state action" includes acts of the
judiciary, the Chief Justice next attacked the problem of whether
state enforcement of these covenants was a denial of equal protection
of the laws in derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment. His solution
is best appreciated in his own words:
We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in
the full and complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts dis-
close that the petitioners were willing purchasers of properties upon
which they desired to establish homes. The owners of the property
were willing sellers and contracts of sales were accordingly con-
sumated. It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would
have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint.s
The Chief Justice observed that this was not abstinence by the
"But the present cases ... do not involve action by state legislatures or
city councils. Here the particular patterns of discrimination ...are determined
..by the terms of the agreements among private individuals. Participation of
the state consists of the enforcement of the restrictions so defined." Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1947).
" "That Amendment [Fourteenth] erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Id. at 13, citing United States v.
Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1882).
"" These are cases in which the purposes of the agreements were secured only
by judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive terms of the agreements."
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1947).
"100 U. S. 339, 347 (1880).
"109 U. S. 3 (1883).
"Judicial proceedings may be in complete accord with procedural due process
and still deny rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. A. F. 0. L. v.
Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941) (enforcement of state Common Law policy of
restraining peaceful picketing; held, denial of right of free discussion); Cantwell
v. Commonwealth, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (conviction in state court for breach of
peace in particular circumstances; held, denial of right of freedom of religion).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 19 (1947).
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states from any affirmative discriminatory act, leaving individuals free
to discriminate, but rather was the use by the plaintiff of the "full
coercive power of the government" to prevent Negroes from equal
enjoyment of the property. Such use could not be tolerated.
This then was the basis for the Court's ruling that racial restrictive
covenants cannot be enforced by injunction. The Shelley case was the
basis for the Barrows case which, by extension, now prohibits dam-
ages for the breach of these covenants.
But the transition was not that easy. In between the Shelley case
and the Barrows case came four similar cases. The first of these four
intermediate cases, Weiss v. Lcaon'9 came before the Supreme Court
of Missouri in 1949. In that case plaintiff Weiss and defendant Leaons
were property owners in a restricted area where all owners had agreed
to prohibit Negro ownership and occupancy for 31 years, as of 1981.
When the Leaons conveyed to Negroes in violation of this agreement,
plaintiff joined the Negro vendees and the Leaons as defendants, and
sued for an injunction to oust the Negroes and for damages for the
breach of the agreement by the Leaons. The trial court dismissed
both counts on the basis of Shelley v. Kraemer. On appeal, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the damages issue
pointing out that there was not even dicta in the Shelley case concern-
ing the constitutionality of granting damages to plaintiff for defendant
covenantor's breach. Then it went on to discuss the differences in
relief between damages at law and specific performance by injunction
at equity and to cite authority that at least one restriction case has
arisen where injunctive relief was denied but damages for its breach
were allowed.20 The court placed great reliance on the American Law
Report's annotation of the Shelley case. That annotation posed the
question as to whether the case stood for the extension of the prohibi-
tion to a recovery of damages.2 1 Using this source and certain other
cases22 decided prior to the Shelley case, which allowed vendees to
sue certain vendors at law for falsely covenanting that all lots sold in
their subdivision were racially restricted, the court convinced itself
that though one remedy, injunction, was ruled out because its en-
forcement would be unconstitutional, that in itself did not rule out the
other remedies such as damages.2 3 Thus it indicated its belief that
19359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. 2d 127 (1949).
' Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N. J. Eq. 181, 147 AUt. 390 (1929) (residential
restriction; court held inequitable to enforce by injunction, but maintained dam-
ages, when realized and ascertained, could be recovered at law).
"3 A. L. R. 2d 441 at 473 (1949).
- Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930); Chandler v. Ziegler,
88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930).
S"Since Shelley v. Kraemer also found the restrictive agreement itself, made
by private parties, was valid as against the charges of unconstitutionality it may
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the method of enforcement and not the right to judicial relief was
what was unconstitutional.24
The second of the intermediate cases was Roberts v. Curtis,2a
brought before the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Judge Holtzoff made short shrift of the issue which was
raised when Roberts sued Curtis for damages for breach of a restric-
tive covenant not to sell certain property to colored persons. The court
stated that although for many years such covenants had been valid
and had been enforced by courts, nevertheless since Hurd v. Hodge2o
and Shelley v. Kraemer the Supreme Court had changed the law
applicable to these covenants. As Holtzoff interpreted these cases the
Supreme Court had deemed restrictive covenants valid only if their
purposes could be achieved by voluntary adherence by the parties
to the agreements. The jurist then went on to say that he believed
that the Supreme Court's ruling had indicated that it was unconstitu-
tional and against public policy to aid in the enforcement of such
covenants by such judicial proceedings of any kind whatsoever, in-
cluding the giving of damages as well as the issuing of an injunction.2 T
The third case was Correll v. Earley"' decided in 1951, by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Its facts and history differ only slightly
from the two previous cases in that there was an added allegation
that in 1945 the defendants entered into a conspiracy to evade and
destroy a racial covenant in their neighborhood in 1926. In 1945
defendants conveyed to one Earley, a financially irresponsible person,
follow that an action for its breach, rather than its enforcement might lie. For
the breach of a valid agreement there is ordinarily a remedy by way of damages.
The fact that another remedy, specific performance, is ruled out because of the
unconstitutional reasons need not necessarily affect the remedy by way of damages
unless it too is unconstitutional under the circumstances. . . . We are of the
opinion that an action for damages for the breach of a valid agreement need not
be affected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court
has not expressly ruled on this question up to this writing so far as we are able to
determine.' Weiss v. Leaon 225 S. W. 2d 127, 131 (1949).
' This, the first of the four cases, received much notoriety especially in Law
Journals where it was almost universally criticized as attempting to obviate the
Shelley decision. Note, 3 ALA. L. BEv. 379 (1951). Note, 15 Mo. L. REv. 313(1950). Note 28 N. C. L. REv. 442 (1950). Note, 63 IAnv. L. Rrv. 1062(1950). Note, 25 N. Y. U. L. REv. 406 (1950). Note, 18 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
417 (1950). Only two of the many articles examined agreed with the Weiss
decision that the Shelley case was not controlling, Note 12 GA. B. J. 498 (1950).
Note, 1950 WASH. U. L. Q. 437, but both writers gave the impression that they
felt that had the Weiss case been appealed to the United States Supreme Court it
would have been reversed.
' 93 Fed. Supp. 604 (D. C., D. C. 1950).
' 334 U. S. 24 (1947).
2 "Although the actions in those cases were suits for injunction, the rule is
broad enough to cover actions for damages as well. I construe the ruling of the
Supreme Court as witholding any assistance by way of judicial action of any kind
from enforcement of such restrictive covenants. Obviously this ruling is binding
on the court." Roberts v. Curtis, 93 Fed. Supp. 604 (D. C., D. C. 1950).
' 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. 2d 1017 (1951).
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who encumbered the property as much as possible and then conveyed
to the Negro defendants in violation of the covenant. Plaintiffs alleged
that the conveyance decreased the value of their residence from
$16,000 to $6,000, and they sued defendants jointly for specific en-
forcement of the covenant and for $10,000 punitive damages (which
they subsequently amended to be actual damages). The trial
court sustained general demurrers to the petition as amended and
the plaintiffs appealed. During the pendency of the action the United
States Supreme Court in 1948 decided Shelley v. Kraemer, and after
referring to the decision in that case the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
held it controlling in regard to the injunctive relief (cancellation of
deeds and ouster of the Negroes) sought by the plaintiff. However
in their discussion of the Shelley case, they indicated their belief that
it held only that power was withheld from state courts to enforce the
covenant against Negro purchasers, and not that any relief whatsoever
was prohibited. Therefore the court deemed the claim for damages
resulting from defendants alleged conspiracy in this case "an entirely
different situation." While they admitted that a state-enforced in-
junction to oust the peaceable Negro occupant was discrimination,
in their opinion compensation for a willful breach of a valid agree-
ment was not.29 The court then held this case to be an instance where
white covenantees, bound by a valid contract, conspired with Negroes
willfully to breach the contract and thus cause damages to the plaintiff.
Such conduct, the court felt, could not be allowed.30 They dis-
cussed the "vicious conspiracy" of the defendant covenantee to convey
to a financially irresponsible white person, who in turn conveyed to
a Negro thereby to prevent damages from being assessed against the
covenantee. This they interpreted to be an action in tort as well as
an action on contract; both actions making the defendant liable- for
damages.31 Thus they seemed to hold that they would allow damages
9 "If the state through the court should forbid coveyance of property to a
party because of his race with the application or use of the power of the state to
compel obedience to the degree which would naturally result, that would amount
to a discrimination by the state in violation of the Federal Constitution. But this
is no rule against Plaintiffs right to collect damages if Plaintiffs have actually
been damaged by the violation of valid contract, violated by Defendants, as a
consumation of a conspiracy to so violate it, with the willful intent to thereby
damage these Plaintiffs.' Id. at 1021.
' "Under the Federal ruling .... Defendant white owners could convey a
legal title to the Negro purchasers and the Negro purchasers could legally pur-
chase the property. But since the restrictive contract was valid the white seller
would act at his peril because he would be required to pay Plaintiffs damages for
breach of a valid contract between himself and other lot owners." Id. at 1022.
31 "But no such thoughts need deter the courts in the matter of mere com-
pensatory damages if willful wrongdoing justifies such damages. That is to say, if
a court requires a white owner of real estate to pay damages which he intentionally
and purposely caused in a direct violation of a valid written contract of which he
had knowledge and of which he was or became a party, that act or judgment by
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for a mere breach of the covenant without the conspiracy and tort
problem. But it is the writer's conviction from language in the case
that if there bad been no conspiracy the court might not have granted
damages.3 2
The fourth and final case of the group is Phillips v. Naff33 which
rounds out these cases two to two, and was decided by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in 1952. It might well be deemed the harbinger
of the Barrows case, both in relation to time and decision. Briefly it
follows the pattern of the previous cases. The restrictive covenant
was made in 1941 by 75 per cent of the land owners on a certain
residential area. The plaintiffs obtained their land in this area in 1945.
The defendants obtained theirs in 1943 and conveyed to some Negroes
in violation of the covenant in 1950. The plaintiff in this case sued
for damages, thus recognizing the inability of equity to grant relief.
Nevertheless the trial court ruled that this was an attempt to circum-
vent the Shelley rule by indirection and granted a motion to dismiss.
On appeal it was admitted by defendants that this was a reciprocal
negative easement running with the land, and as such, valid at law.
Nevertheless they contended, and the court agreed, that although this
contract was valid it still required state action to enforce it, and such
state action seemed prohibited. However, the court decided that this
state action was indirect,34 and there was some uncertainty concern-
ing its unconstitutionality.35 Therefore the court felt that the question
was an open one for them after considering the Weiss decision, they
expressed disagreement with it. They maintained that if the vendee
could be sued for the breach of the covenant, it "would operate to
inhibit freedom of purchase by those against whom discrimination is
directed, and also to place a burden on the right of an owner to sell
to d purchaser of his own selection."3 ' They concluded that Shelley
v. Kraemer was broad enough to prohibit this "indirect" method of
enforcement, that is, the giving of damages for the breach.37
the court would not constitute any act or judgment by the state against a negro
citizen. None of the Defendants had any right to knowingly injure the value of
the property of another citizen." Id. at 1022.
'This view is also shared by other Law Journal writers and at least one of
them believes that it was the conspiracy plus the "geographical locale of the court"
that was the prime influencing factor in the case. Note, 4 ALA. L. REv. 289 at 293(1952).
332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. 2d 158 (1952).
" "We are in accord with the view . . . that liability for suits for damages for
breach of a reciprocal racial restriction constitutes an indirect method of enforce-
ment." Id. at 162.
"Because of the fact that the specific issue involved in the case of bar was
not expressly determined by the court in Shelley v. Kraemer . . . or discussed in
Hurd v. Hodge, some uncertainty has arisen ... " Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
""We think the reasons in ... Shelley v. Kraemer . .. operate in bar of an
indirect method of enforcement and are sufficiently broad in scope as to cover the
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These then are four important intermediate cases between Shelley
v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson. Their inconsistency led many
legal writers to various comments and predictions, with the majority
believing that the Supreme Court of the United States would make
no differentiation between equitable and legal relief.3 Needless to
say, they were correct.
But the problem does not end here. Barrows v. Jackson was no
miraculous cure-all. It would be folly to assume that the demise of
the racial restrictive covenant could end the discrimination in real
property so easily.3 9 The problem is larger than it appears at first
blush. It is not merely sociological, but also has vast economic rami-
fications. An excellent practical picture of the magnitude of the eco-
nomic problem is given in the Society of Residential Appraisers'
periodical, The Review. In an article entitled "Racial Infiltration"
written by George A. Phillips, a lawyer, broker, and senior member
of the Society, the problem of evaluating the effect of racial infiltration
on property values is discussed with a practically mathematical cer-
tainty. In other words the financial effect of racial infiltration into
white neighborhoods is so pronounced and consistent today that it
can be measured and computed on exactly the same basis as physical
depreciation. Mr. Phillips pointed out that since a prohibition on
injunctive relief has rendered the restrictive covenant impotent, real
estate appraisers must now take into consideration, as part of evaluat-
ing property, allowances for the probability of Negro infiltration.40
There being such an economic incentive, it is obvious that pres-
sure will be brought on the Bar to find legitimate and legally binding
rights of those affected in the instant controversy. The Fourteenth Amendment,
as construed, prevents the maintenance of the action for damages by Plaintiffs."
Id. at 164.
'Note, 38 CoaN. L. Q. 236 (1953); Note, So. CALIF. L. REv. 201 (1953);
Note, 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 112 (1952); Note, 1953 U. C. L. A. INThA L. REv.
51; Note, U. Cnv. L. REv. 97 (1953). "In view of the direct conflict of the state
courts on this issue, it is probable that the question will eventually be raised in
the U. S. Supreme Court; if so, logical extension of the holding in the Restrictive
Covenant Cases would seem to demand that no distinction be drawn between
equitable and legal enforcement of racial restrictive covenants in applying the
14th Amendment." Note, 51 MicH. L. REv. 288, 290 (1952).
"For detailed statistical information on comparative Negro and White hous-
ing and an excellent discussion of the problem, see Note, 57 YALE L. J. 427 (1948).
For theoretical discussion, see 29 N. D. L. 157 (1948).
" "Should a shift to a buyers' market start in any neighborhood prices of the
less attractive houses are the first and most detrimentally affected. This has been
markedly true where the shift is from White to Negro population and the first
two or three houses usually are sold to Negroes at a few hundred dollars above
the market. In a few months sale prices drop below prices for comparable houses
on white owned and occupied streets. After the change is past the half way
mark, prices stabilize at an average price of perhaps 10% below prices of com-
parable houses in white neighborhoods. The loss of price however, is much
greater on a street of mansion type houses or on a street of less substantial hous-
ing." Vol. 16, No. 1, P. 7 (1950).
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methods of avoiding the above -decisions. What then could the Bar
use as a substitute for the racial restrictive covenant, since any method
which requires judicial enforcement now appears outlawed? Immedi-
ately after Shelley v. Kraemer four devices or methods were advanced:
one, the creation of estates of limited duration; two, the use of penalty
bonds; three, a reservation in deeds of an option to repurchase; four,
the posting of a money deposit.41 A discussion of the legality and
practicality of each possibility follows.
The creation of an estate of limited duration is the first method.
It consists of the grantor giving the grantee a fee simple estate subject
to the condition subsequent that he never lease or convey to a non-
Caucasian. This determinable fee, or conditional estate, creates a
future interest in the grantor. When the transfer is made by the
grantee to the Negro and the condition is thereby breached, the
grantee's estate terminates and the future interest and all possessory
rights immediately vest in the grantor. In the case of a whole neigh-
borhood or subdivision, a meeting could be held, and deeds absolute
could be given by the owners to a Property Owner's Association. Then
in return, the owners would be given back deeds creating estates of
limited duration.
The problems which this might create would be many and con-
fusing. For one, there would be the point that this was aimed directly
at discrimination against Negroes, and an action in ejectment might
fail under Shelley v. Kraemer. But this is a valid deed and the pos-
sessory rights now vests in the Association. Therefore if the subse-
quent grantee sought an action to remove cloud on title, it might fail
because full and complete title would now rest in the Association.
Suppose the Association attempted to use self-help in recovering
property to which it had valid title. Would violence on its part subject
it to criminal action for breach of the peace, or peaceful means make
it liable for trespass on its "own" land?42 Only another Supreme
Court decision could answer these questions concerning the means
of enforcement.
The second plan would be the use of a cash penalty bond,43 given
by each successive grantee to insure compliance with a restrictive
condition. The bond would be held in escrow and payable to the
original grantor by the escrow agent if there was a wrongful transfer.
Again the purpose would be racial restriction but since there
-12 VAwD. L. REv. 119 (1948).
For a discussion of self help in recovery of personalty in similar situation
see Wade, Legal Status of Property Transferred under an Illegal Transaction,
41 ILL. L. REv. 487, 494-5 (1946).
"For general discussion of penalty bonds see 3 WILIsJoN, CoNTnucrs sec.
774-84 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
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would be no need for judicial enforcement, unless the escrow agent
refused to transfer to the original grantor, a large loophole presents
itself. However, if the escrow holder did refuse, there probably would
be no way to force him to comply, under the broad sbope of Barrows
v. Jackson.44
The third method that might be used to circumvent these decisions
is the use of a reservation in the deeds of an option to repurchase *the
property in question from the grantee,45 at a reasonable price at that
time. This would consist of the original grantor placing a covenant
in the deed allowing him to repurchase at any time a sale was con-
templated by the grantee within the maximum period allowed under
the law of perpetuities.46 This of course would allow the grantor to
repurchase 47 without the question of discrimination being brought
before the court, even though this might be the sole purpose for the
grantor exercising his right. However, two problems present them-
selves immediately. First, the court when asked for specific enforce-
ment of the option might look behind the option and deem the action
discriminatory and thereby refuse specific performance. Second, there
is the practical aspect of the buyer who might very well not wish to
accept a deed which could subject him to the possibility of a forced
sale back to the grantor at any time in the future. Nevertheless this
is a possibility of avoiding the decisions of the Shelley and Barrows
cases, since no state action would be needed to enforce a covenant
obviously discriminatory on its face.
The fourth possibility requires no state action whatever. The
grantor would obtain a personal money deposit from each subsequent
grantee to be forfeited to the grantor in case of transfer or lease to a
member of the prohibited race. As each grantee transferred the
property he would post the deposits to the original grantor who would
in turn release the prior grantee. As property values increased or
"The escrow holder might be forced to comply If some sort of conspiracy
had taken place between the grantee and the escrow holder. This of course would
create a problem for the court of the public policy of either enforcing the escrow
agreement to the detriment of the discrimination angle, versus the public policy
of allowing a fraudulent conspiracy to take place on a contract which was in and
of itself neither void nor illegal by the express ruling of Barrows v. Jackson. A
method of avoiding this problem, however, would be to make a Property Owners
Association the escrow holder.
" For a more elaborate discussion of options to repurchase see REsTATEmENT,
PRoPERTY sec. 894 (1944). Another way to accomplish the same purpose would
be to have long term leases. The initial payments might be such as to cover the
cost of building with nominal payments thereafter. And again the leases could be
held by a Property Owners Association.
"a For detailed discussion of Common Law Rule against perpetuities see RE-
STATEME, PROPERTY sec. 374 (1944).
' "We are of the opinion that the repurchase clause is sufficient to support a
suit for specific performance. . ." School Board of Roanoke v. Payne, 151 Va.
240, 144 S. E. 444, 446 (1928).
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decreased the deposit could be raised or lowered in an equivalent
ratio. One problem would be the impracticability of the method in
that it would tend to discourge even good faith purchasers because
of the necessity of tying up such a considerable sum for such an
indefinite period. However some arrangement might be made whereby
the money is invested and the proceeds sent to the grantee. Another
problem would arise when many land owners had suffered because
of decreased property values due to the conveyance to a Negro. The
deposit in such a case would not be large enough for indemnifying all
the damaged landowners. However this problem is not likely to arise
since the deposit is partially a deterrent as well as a compensatory
measure.
There no doubt would be the problem of competent drafting in
all these methods but this could be corrected after a few attempts.
Any hesitancy on the part of would-be purchasers could be resolved
on the basis of the degree of their desire to move into a restricted
neighborhood.48 It would appear to the writer that the use of these
deposits is the only method now available which, either by dicta or
by decision, is left open to the white property owners to protect them-
selves from the property devaluation which results from an influx of
Negroes into their area. Any one of the three advanced earlier in
this article might be allowed, but it is to be doubted, although that is
not to say they will not be tried.
That such problems would face the lower courts, and confusion
derived from various conflicting decisions on these points would re-
sult is exactly what Chief Justice Vinson hoped to prevent in his
narrow decision in Shelley v. Kraemer and his vigorous dissent in
Barrows v. Jackson. In his dissent he spoke of the law as clear that
covenants themselves are valid and legally enforceable if the method
of enforcement is valid.49 He argued that the plaintiff in the Barrows
case was seeking only to have the defendant "disgorge that which was
gained at the expense of the depreciation of her neighbor's property."
The Chief Justice referred to his decision in the Shelley case in
an attempt to point out the error he believed the majority was mak-
ing when they extended what he deemed a narrow holding into a
broad sweeping decision calculated to create more indecision and
problems than it prevented.50 It is the writer's opinion that the Chief
"For a discussion on a analogous type of deposit see 3 WLISTON, CoN-
TRACTS sec. 790 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
4' "These racial restrictive covenants, whatever we may think of them, are not
lg al nullities so far as any doctrine of federal law is concerned; it is not unlaw-
l to make them; it is not unlawful to enforce them unless the method by which
they are enforced in some way contravenes the Federal Constitution or a Federal
Statute." Barrows v. Jackson 346 U. S. 249 at 261 (1953).0 "Thus, in the Shelley case, it was not the covenants which were struck down
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Justice was attempting to avoid the problems that the Court would
face when desperate lawyers would seize on this "unenforceable" but
"valid" covenant to find a way to enforce it themselves, or else to put
it into an enforceable form.
This is not a new problem, nor did it go unnoticed after Shelley v.
Kraemer created it. A number of Law Journal writers expressed
sentiments similar to the following, which was written just prior to
Barrows v. Jackson:
Does the Supreme Court really incline toward the position that the
restrictive covenants when enforced are the violations of the equal
protections clause or are they invalid per se? It is probable that these
decisions will give rise to actions for damages for breach of covenant.
If so, the above question must of necessity be decided, for then the
cause of action will not involve issues of equal protection of the laws
or discrimination, but will present squarely to the Court the question
of the inherent validity of the covenant itself.n
The writer predicts that the Supreme Court will be faced with
this question again, and in such a manner that it will have to decide
unequivocally that such covenants, restrictions, terms, limitations or
conditions, in any manner worded, or to be enforced are void. Other-
vise, innumerable attempts in various shapes, shades, and sizes will
forever be before the courts as property owners contrive other means
to "restrict Negroes to their overcrowded Harlems."5 2
ROGER B. LELAND
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT
In Kentucky and other states which follow the federal rule that
evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement officers is not admis-
sible, the laws surrounding search and seizure become an important
factor in the administration of the criminal law. In these jurisdictions,
when the evidence has been obtained by searching the accused or his
effects, the defense counsel should not overlook the possibility of ob-
jecting to its admissibility on the ground that the seizure of the evi-
but the judicial enforcement of them against Negro vendees. The question which
we decided was simply whether a state court could decree the ouster of Negroes
from property which they had purchased and which they were enjoying. We
held that it could not. We held that such judicial action, which operated directly
against the Negro petitioners and deprived them of their right to enjoy their
property solely because of their race, was state action and constituted a denial of
equal protection .... This case is different." Id. at 261.
' Note, 33 CoRN. L. Q. 293 at 294 (1947).
"'Note, 13 ALB.ANY L. 11Ev. 92, 96 (1949).
